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THE LITTLE PRINCE AND THE BUSINESSMAN:
CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
JESWALD W. SALACUSE"
"How is it possible for one to own the stars?"
"To whom do they belong?" the businessman retorted, peevishly.
"I don't know. To nobody."
"Then they belong to me, because I was the first person to think
of it."1
I. INTRODUCTION
NTERNATIONAL air law has been fraught with tensions and
conflicts since the very beginning of aviation. While individual
issues such as those relating to air traffic rights and user charges
have invariably provoked a broad spectrum of diverse opinion,
the persistence of a continuing state of tension would appear to
arise basically from two fundamentally opposing attitudes about
the way in which international issues ought to be resolved: through
the unilateral exercise of national power or the application of
internationally accepted rules.' A few years, ago, H. A. Wassen-
bergh, a noted scholar and airline executive, pointed to the exist-
ence of this basic dichotomy in international air law: "There are
mainly two ways to regulate international civil aviation: a. agree
*Dean Designate, 'Southern Methodist University School of Law; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1963; A.B., Hamilton College, 1960; Diplonie, Univer-
sity of Paris, 1959. Member of the Bar of the State of New York, Formerly,
Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School. Formerly, Middle East Regional Advisor
on Law and Development, The Ford Foundation. The author is indebted to Mr.
Richard W. Bogosian, Chief, Aviation Negotiations Division, Department of
State, for his thoughtful comments on the original version of this paper.
1 A. DE SAINT EXUPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 46 (K. Woods trans. 1943).
2 Professor John Jackson has termed these two approaches "power oriented"
and "rule oriented diplomacy." Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Lib-
eral Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 98-99 (1978).
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on common general principles and apply these principles to the
operation of international air services; or b. for individual states
to try to enlarge their sphere of influence in international civil
aviation by any available means. '
In less prosaic, more poetic terms, Antoine de Saint Exupery,
the renowned pilot, writer, and poet of flight, also evoked this
basic tension between national action and international norms in
The Little Prince, a charming tale which continues to captivate
adults and children alike. The Little Prince, it will be recalled,
left his asteroid to explore other planets where, like Voltaire's
Candide, he discovered with wonderment much about the human
species. On one planet, he met a businessman who purported to
own the stars because no one else before him had ever thought of
owning them.' Incredulous at this notion, the Little Prince re-
sponded that to own something one must be of some use to it
and that the businessman was of no use whatsoever to the stars.'
Like the Little Prince and the businessman, the members of
the international community, in seeking to regulate international
aviation, have struggled for years over the diverse implications of
a fundamental question: Who owns the sky? On any given issue
some states have proceeded from a position that assumes the tri-
umph of unilateral action and national ownership, while others
have espoused the supremacy of international law and control.
Few states, however, have held to either position consistently
throughout the history of aviation and the various conflicts which
have characterized its development. Yesterday's Little Prince has
a way of becoming today's' businessman. At all times, of course,
the justifications presented for any particular approach to the
regulation of international aviation have been as elaborate as
those advanced in the debate over the ownership of the stars. The
:1 H. WASSENBERGH, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION LAW IN A
NEW ERA 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WASSENBERGH].
'A. DE SAINT EXUPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 43-47 (K. Woods trans. 1943).
The businessman offered the following justification for his position:
When you find a diamond that belongs to nobody, it is yours.
When you discover an island that belongs to nobody, it is yours.
When you get an idea before any one else, you take out a patent
on it; it is yours. So with me: I own the stars, because nobody else
before me ever thought of owning them.
Id. at 46.
',Id. at 46-47.
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purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the tensions and
conflicts, both past and present, in public international air law
'resulting from these two opposing approaches and then to explore
how the law may eventually reconcile the competing demands of
the Little Prince and the businessman.
II. CONFLICTS PAST
The historical development of international air law has thus
far passed through three distinct phases: a) the period before
1919; b) the period from the 1919 Paris Convention on Aerial
Navigation to the 1944 Chicago Convention on International
Civil Avihtion; and c) the period since 1944. While each period
has witnessed the further elaboration of an international legal
framework for civil aviation, each has also been characterized by
a prevailing state of tension.
A. The Period Before 1919
The advent of aviation, like the emergence of many other major
scientific and technological innovations in history, occurred in the
absence of law to regulate its use. While individual states soon
began to enact domestic legislation to protect the lives and prop-
erty of their citizens,6 it was clear almost from the start that
aviation's potential for international transportation presented un-
doubted legal problems of an international character. International
law at the time, however, offered little in the way of solutions.
Treaties on any aspect of international air transportation were
nonexistent, and the practice of states with regard to balloons and
aircraft had not yet solidified to the point where one could say
with certainty that customary rules of international law existed.
Legal scholars jumped into this void in an effort to contribute
to the elaboration of appropriate legal principles to foster the de-
velopment of international aviation. Their primary and funda-
mental concern was to determine the extent and nature of the
rights of states in the airspace above their territories.7 They grap-
6 See P. SAND, G. PRATT & J. LYON, AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE LAW
OF FLIGHT 4-7 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SAND, PRATT & LYON].
7W. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 2 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as WAGNER].
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pled with numerous questions: Could the aircraft from one state
freely enter the airspace of another? If not, what restrictions might
be imposed? If they might freely enter such airspace, might they
also freely land on the subjacent territory? If not, did a special
exception exist for aircraft in distress? In essence, the basic issue
was one of sovereignty in the international legal sense-"owner-
ship" in the lexicon of the Little Prince.'
European scholars dominated this discussion, and those from
France, the site of early significant aeronautical achievements,
were particularly active. Reasoning by analogy from existing in-
ternational legal principles governing territory and the sea, they
eventually formulated several distinct positions on the question
of state sovereignty over airspace. On the one hand, certain schol-
ars, influenced by the rule of freedom of the high seas, advocated
the absolute freedom of air navigation, arguing that all types of
aircraft should be free to fly at any altitude without any right of
control in the subjacent states.' At the opposite end of the spec-
trum, other authors, concerned with the security interests of sub-
jacent states and influenced by traditional legal principles governing
state territory, took the position that a state had absolute
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory without limit as
to altitude.'" Under this theory, freedom of air navigation would
exist only over the high seas and no man's land."
Between these two extreme positions various intermediate
schools of thought existed. Some, influenced by the distinctions in
maritime law between the territorial sea and the high seas, advo-
cated that freedom of the air exist above a certain altitude, but
that the space below such altitude be considered a zone of "terri-
torial air" subject to the absolute sovereignty of the subjacent state."
Others argued that to protect the vital interests of the state while
I "Territorial sovereignty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in pri-
vate law, less marked, however, today than it was in the day of the patrimonial
state, when a kingdom and everything in it was regarded as being to the king
very much what a landed estate was to its owner." J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS
162 (6th ed. 1963).
"See, e.g., Nye, Droit et Aerostats, 4 REVUE DE DROIT INr'L 501 (1902).
See WAGNER, supra note 7, at 13-14.
"°See, e.g., H. HAZELTINE, THI LAW OF THE AIR 1-53 (1971). See WAGNER,
supra note 7, at 14-16.
"WAGNER, supra note 7, at 16.
"1Id. at 21-23.
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at the same time permitting development of aviation, airspace
over state territory at any altitude should be submitted to its
limited sovereignty." The nature of the limitation was basically
functional." Thus, while a state might prevent military aircraft
from flying over its territory, it ought not to obstruct the passage
of innocent, civil aircraft.'
The debate among the writers proceeded actively and generated
a significant amount of publication during the first two decades
of the twentieth century; however, the writings of scholars do not
create rules of international law. The primary sources of inter-
national law are treaties and international custom as evidenced
by practice.' With regard to the latter, national legislation, as
well as diplomatic actions in response to various aerial incidents,
strongly suggested that the states considered their sovereignty to
extend to the airspace over their territories. With the advent of
World War I and the development of military aviation, they
definitively rejected absolute freedom of the air and enforced the
principle of sovereignty to the point where it appeared to be a
customary rule of international law."'
Beginning in 1898, a few states began to conclude bilateral
agreements to regulate selected aspects of international aviation;
however, a multilateral treaty establishing a general legal frame-
work for international civil aviation would elude the international
" Id. at 16-31.
14 SAND, PRATT & LYON, supra note 6, at 8. See also WAGNER, supra note 7,
at 25-28.
15 WAGNER, supra note 7, at 28. This was clearly analogous to right of inno-
cent passage granted to ships by international law.
"'A more particularized listing of the sources of international law may be
found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, [1970]
U.N.Y.B. 1017, which provides as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with inter-
national law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Id.
"7WAGNER, supra note 7, at 36; SAND, PRATTr & LYON, supra note 6, at 12.
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community until after World War I. In May, 1910, the European
states attempted a step in this direction with an eighteen-nation
international conference" in Paris to draft such a treaty. The con-
ference failed, however, because the participants were unable to
reach agreement on the fundamental question of state sovereignty
over airspace, the issue that had attracted scholars' attention from
the very start."' While none of the delegates advocated the abso-
lute freedom of airspace and all recognized that the interests of
subjacent states required at least some limitations on the right of
foreign aircraft to fly over state territory, they remained sharply
divided over the extent to which sovereignty could be exercised.'"
On the one hand, Great Britain took the position that each state
had absolute sovereignty over the airspace above its land and
territorial waters and that it was not required to treat national
and foreign aircraft on an equal basis." France, on the other hand,
argued for the recognition of the limited freedom of the air, a
position which would permit a state to enact certain regulations
necessary to protect its interests but deny it the right to prohibit
civil aviation altogether. ' In addition, the restrictions that a state
did enact were to be applied without discrimination as to the
nationality of the aircraft." Once more the debate between the
Little Prince and the businessman had been joined and once more
the two protagonists failed to reach agreement on who owned the
air.
World War I did much to advance aviation technology as well
as to demonstrate its military potential. As a result, states came
to recognize the need to adopt uniform principles to foster the
development of international air transportation, but the threat
18 See generally Pepin, La Conference de Paris de 1910, 3 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 185 (1978). See also Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference,
Paris 1910, 19 J. ArR L. & CoM. 127 (1952).
1" SAND, PRATr & LYON, supra note 6, at 10.
20 Id.
11 Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 1910, 19 J.
AIR L. & COM. 127, 134 (1952).
22 Id. at 131.
" Id. at 140. Despite the fact that the conference adjourned less than two
months after it was convened without arriving at an agreement on the text of
an appropriate treaty, it did complete a lengthy draft convention whose prin-
ciples would later influence the Paris Convention of 1919 and the Chicago Con-
vention of 1944. SAND, PRATr & LYON, supra note 6, at 10.
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which aviation posed to their security also led them to affirm
their sovereignty over the airspace above their territories and
territorial waters. In order to establish an appropriate interna-
tional legal framework for post-war civil aviation, France con-
vened an international conference in Paris in March, 1919."
Thirty-eight states attended, and this time the delegates, relying
to a significant extent on the earlier work of scholars and the de-
liberations of the 1910 conference, were successful in reaching an
agreement on the text of a treaty: the Convention Relating to the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation, which was opened for signature
on October 13, 1919.'
B. From the 1919 Paris Convention to the 1944 Chicago
Convention
The Paris Convention of 1919, the first multilateral treaty con-
cerning air law, settled the question which legal scholars had
been debating for more than twenty years: a state did indeed have
sovereignty over the air space above its territory. The first sentence
of article 1 stated: "The High Contracting Parties recognize that
every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air
space above its territory."' The operative word was "recognize,"
not "grant" or "agree." That choice was a clear indication that
24 WAGNER, supra note 7, at 39.
2 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, signed, Oct.
13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter cited as the Paris Convention]. Thirty-two
states ultimately ratified the Convention. WAGNER, supra note 7, at 51. Although
the United States attended the Paris Conference and signed the text, it never
ratified the treaty and thus was never bound by it. Jones, The Equation of
Aviation Policy, 27 J. AIR L. & CoM. 221, 225 (1960).
"Paris Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1. The second sentence of article
1 proceeded to define "the territory of a state" as "including the national terri-
tory, both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial
waters adjacent thereto." Paris Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1. The United
States would incorporate the principle and language of article 1 of the 1919
Paris Convention in section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No.
69-254, § 6, 44 Stat. 572 (1926), the current version of which appears at 49
U.S.C. S 1508 (1976):
The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace above
the United States, including the airspace above all inland waters
and the airspace above those portions of the adjacent marginal high
seas, bays, and lakes, over which by international law or treaty or
convention the United States exercises national jurisdiction.
49 U.S.C. 5 1508 (1976).
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sovereignty over airspace was a customary principle of interna-
tional law which existed apart from the Convention and did not
come into existence because of it. Moreover, "every Power," not
just the signatories to the Convention, was recognized as having
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory. The Convention itself did not define "sovereignty" or
delineate fully its implications for purposes of regulating interna-
tional air transportation. For example, it did not specify to what
height in the atmosphere a state had sovereignty.
Sovereignty, as ordinarily understood in international law, is
the right of a state in regard to a certain area of the world to
exercise jurisdiction over persons and things to the exclusion of
the jurisdiction of other states." The exercise of state jurisdiction
is, however, subject to the limitations imposed by international
law, a restriction whose nature and content are not universally
agreed upon by either states or scholars. Nonetheless, the recog-
nition of exclusive sovereignty in the airspace above state territory
clearly gave the subjacent state the right to enact regulations on
air traffic, to exercise police powers, and even to prohibit foreign
aircraft altogether from entering or passing through its airspace."
The implications of this principle were clear: if international avia-
tion was to develop at all, it would have to proceed on the basis
of agreements among states, rather than on any general principle
of international law which guaranteed freedom of the air. More-
over, individual states, by withholding agreement, had significant
power to obstruct international air transportation.
It would thus appear at first glance that the 1919 Paris Con-
vention represented a victory of the businessman over the Little
Prince; and, indeed, various legal scholars, in tones faintly remi-
niscent of Saint Exupery's little hero, strongly criticized the Con-
vention for having chosen sovereignty instead of freedom of the
air.' On the other hand, the adoption of the principle of sovereignty
may have placed the international community irrevocably on the
path of seeking an international legal framework for aviation
which would be acceptable to both large and small states alike.
27 1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 15 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT].
28 WAGNER, supra note 7, at 41.
29 See WAGNER, supra note 7, at 62-89.
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A regime based on freedom of the skies might have faciliated un-
fettered unilateral action and a "power oriented approach"'  to
international aviation, an approach that in the end would have
benefited the large states and those with substantial aviation ca-
pacity at the expense of the small.
In order to establish the needed consensual basis for interna-
tional air transportation, article 2 of the Paris Convention pro-
vided: "Each contracting State undertakes in time of peace to
accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the air-
craft of the other contracting states, provided that the conditions
laid down in the present Convention are observed."' The exercise
of this freedom, analogous to the right of innocent passage granted
to foreign ships in the territorial waters of a state,"2 could be sub-
jected to restrictions and limitations imposed by the subjacent state,
provided it did so without distinction as to nationality. Thus, the
overflown state could prescribe the route which such aircraft
might take,' prohibit flight over certain areas for military or public
safety purposes," and require such aircraft to land on its territory
for "reasons of general security.9'
At best, the Paris Convention set down an incomplete basis
for international aviation in the post-war era. While it granted to
the contracting parties the freedom of transit-ultimately to be
known as the "first freedom"-it stated nothing about the "second
freedom," the freedom to land on foreign territory.' Some authors
therefore concluded that the second freedom was not granted,
but others argued that it must be implied in the freedom of tran-
sit." An even greater defect of the Convention, however, was its
failure to come to grips with the problem of commercial aviation.
' See Jackson, supra note 2, at 98-99.
31 The first sentence of article 15 of the Paris Convention appeared to repeat
the substance of article 2, for it provided: "Every aircraft of a contracting State
has the right to cross the airspace of another State without landing." Paris Con-
vention, supra note 25, at art. 15.
1 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done, Apr. 29,
1958, art. 14, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
' Paris Convention, supra note 25, at art. 15.
Id. at art. 3.
MId. at art. 15.
"'WAGNER, supra note 7, at 47.
" See id. at 47-48.
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Before 1919, the principal tension in international air law was
essentially political in character, for beneath the debate over
sovereignty and freedom of the air lay a concern for national
security. After 1919, the tensions would become increasingly
economic in nature as the states came to realize that international
aviation could become an important source of revenue in which
their national airlines might share. The 1919 Convention hardly
mentioned commercial aviation at all and did not recognize it as
a distinct branch of international aviation in general. Although
articles 2 and 15 granted the freedom of innocent passage,"' the
last paragraph of article 15 provided: "The establishment of inter-
national airways shall be subject to the consent of the states flown
over.'
9
It was not clear whether this provision was to be read as a
limitation on the freedom of transit granted in articles 2 and 15
so as to require commercial airline flights to obtain the express
agreement of the overflown state. Some argued that the final
sentence of article 15 merely referred to the setting up of ground
facilities in support of airline operations,"' or that the word "air-
line" referred to designated "routes" rather than "services." The
matter caused considerable controversy and was only resolved in
1929 when the Convention was amended to provide that "[e]very
contracting State may make conditional on its prior authorization
the establishment of international airways and the creation and
operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or
without landing, on its territory."* Thus, having come to realize
the economic potential of commercial aviation and seeking to
protect their own national airlines, the states excluded regulation
of commercial aviation from the provisions of the Paris Conven-
tion and thereby made it subject to other arrangements, notably
bilateral agreements.
The Convention did contribute significantly to the advancement
"' Paris Convention, supra note 25, at arts. 2, 15.
39 Id. at art. 15.
40 WAGNER, supra note 7, at 49.
1 Goedhuis, Civil Aviation After the War, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601 (1942).
Protocol Concerning Amendments to Articles 3, 5, 7, 15, 34, 37, 41, 42 and
to the Final Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation, signed, June 15, 1929, art. 15, 138 L.N.T.S. 418, 421.
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of international air law in other respects. It set down basic prin-
ciples on the nationality and registration of aircraft,' required
certificates of air worthiness of aircraft engaged in international
navigation," required aircraft personnel to hold certificates of
competency," and specified rules on a variety of technical matters,
including customs ' and takeoffs and landings."" In addition, it cre-
ated the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN),"
a permanent organization under the League of Nations, composed
of representatives of the contracting states. The duties of the
commission were to collect and communicate relevant data to
the member states on such matters as international air navigation
and meteorology; to propose necessary amendments of the Con-
vention; to implement the technical rules and to amend them if
necessary; and to give advice on any matters requested by the
member states.' ICAN played an active role in the development
of international aviation between the two world wars,"0 and its
functions would be assumed by the International Civil Aviation
Organization in 1947."
Prior to 1919, scholars and governments had concerned them-
selves primarily with issues of public international law. With the
growth of aviation after World War I, they turned their attention
to matters of private international law, particularly liability for
damage caused by aircraft, property rights in aircraft, collisions,
insurance, and bills of lading. Not only was there a need for
appropriate rules on these subjects, but it was also important that
the law be as uniform as possible throughout the world. Toward
this end, France convened the First International Conference on
43 Paris Convention, supra note 25, at arts. 5-8.
44Id. at arts. 11, 13.
45 Id. at art. 14.
4I Id. at Annex H.
4 7 Id. at arts. 19-25.
48 id. at art. 34. This organization is also known as CINA, an acronym derived
from the French-language form of its name: Commission Internationale de
Navigation Aerienne.
49 Id.
50 SAND, PRATT & LYON, supra note 6, at 14.
"I See Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature,
Dec. 7, 1944, entered into force, Apr. 4, 1947, art. 43, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention].
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Private Air Law in Paris in 1925 with the basic purpose of draft-
ing a treaty on the liability of carriers in international transporta-
tion and of determining whether the states should seek to unify
private international air law." One of the concrete results of the
conference was the creation of the Comit6 International d'Experts
Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA)," an advisory committee of legal
experts which was to undertake the studies necessary to achieve
the goal of unified law on various aspects of international aviation.
In the following years, CITEJA was instrumental in preparing
various treaties which were then submitted to subsequent Inter-
national Conferences on Private Air Law.5' They included the
Warsaw Convention of 1929 on the liability of air carriers for
injury to persons, baggage, and goods transported;" the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Precau-
tionary Attachment of Aircraft;" and the Rome Convention on
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Damages Caused by
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface.'
The period between the world wars had witnessed a con-
siderable advance in the development of international air law.
The nations of the world had reached agreement on certain prin-
ciples of public and private international air law, particularly in
the technical domain, and had created two international organiza-
tions to continue the process of international legal development."
On the other hand, a comprehensive multilateral legal framework
-particularly with respect to commercial exploitation of interna-
tional aviation-had failed to materialize.
"SAND, PRATT & LYON, supra note 6, at 16.
53 See Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical
Committee of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. AIm L. & CoM. 27, 30-32
(1932).
"Id. at 32-40.
"Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Regarding International
Transport, signed, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
"Signed, May 29, 1933, 192 L.N.T.S. 289.
', 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, Am LAw 73 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as 2 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT]. It did not go into effect until 1942 and
only five countries ratified it. Id.
5"A third organization-the International Air Traffic Association, composed
of air carriers-had come into existence in 1919. SAND, PRATT & LYON, supra
note 6, at 21-22.
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C. The Period Since 1944
The second world war, like its predecessor, served to advance
aviation technology substantially in virtually every respect, in-
cluding the speed, range, capacity, and navigational accuracy of
aircraft. As a result, the nations of the world appeared to have
the ability to develop on an economic basis a truly international
air transportation network spanning the entire globe. As the war
drew to a close, the Allied Powers recognized the need to establish
the legal and organizational foundations of the new era of inter-
national civil aviation, but they differed considerably on the basic
principles which were to govern such a system." The United States
had attained a clear position of dominance in aviation capability,
and certain countries, particularly the United Kingdom, were fear-
ful of the emergence of an American monopoly against which they
could not profitably compete."0
In order to formulate the principles for post-war international
aviation, the United States, after some preliminary discussions
with other governments, convened at Chicago on November 1,
1944, an international conference whose objective was to "con-
cern itself chiefly with matters of routes, land rights, and the
general principles of air navigation and international air organi-
zation." 6 The official invitation expressed the hope that "[t]his
conference might also agree so far as possible upon the principles
of a permanent international structure of civil aviation and air
transport."" Representatives of fifty-four states attended, and it
appears that at least some were hopeful that the Chicago Confer-
ence would accomplish for international aviation what the Bretton
Woods Conference, a few months earlier, had done for the inter-
national monetary system and post-war reconstruction.
"'See notes 49-53 and accompanying text, supra.
60 WAGNER, supra note 7, at 85-87.
61Pre-conference letter of chairman Adolf A. Berle, then United States
Assistant Secretary of State (quoted in Osterhout, A Review of the Recent Chi-
cago International Air Conference, 31 VA. L. REV. 176, 176 (1945)).
62 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AvIA-
TION CONFERENCE 11 (1948) [hereinafter cited as I PROCEEDINGS]. The Confer-
ence agenda consisted of four principal items: (1) multilateral aviation con-
vention and international aeronautical body; (2) technical standards and pro-
cedures; (3) arrangements covering transitional period; and (4) consideration
of establishment of Interim Council. Id. at 14-15.
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The Chicago Conference had both a short-term and a long-term
objective: to enable civil aviation to resume normal operations as
soon as possible after the termination of hostilities and to establish
a system to foster expansion of aviation in the post-war era."
Whereas the 1919 Paris Conference had been concerned with
aviation's implications for national security, the Chicago Confer-
ence focused primarily on the economic consequences of aviation
development and the way in which the individual states and their
national airlines were to benefit from and participate in that de-
velopment in the years ahead. The question was no longer merely:
Who owns the sky? Rather, it was: Who owns the right to exploit
international air transportation commercially and on what basis?
"Freedom of the air" as a slogan had been replaced by "free
trade by air.""
The states at the conference advanced several distinct and con-
flicting positions on this question, reflecting to a large extent the
state of their individual capabilities in the field of aviation. At one
extreme, New Zealand, supported by Australia, proposed the cre-
ation of an international air transport authority, possibly attached
to the United Nations, which would own aircraft and have exclu-
sive right to operate them on international trunk routes.'" Viewing
international aviation as essentially an international public utility,
rather than as a form of commerce which would only lead to
conflict among the nations of the world, the New Zealand pro-
posal appeared to be based on the assumption that the sky "be-
longed" to everyone, thus accepting neither the approach of the
Little Prince nor that of the businessman. It was res communis
(a common possession), not res nullius (a possession of no one).
At the other extreme, the United States, the leading air power
at the conference, advocated a position essentially of "free enter-
prise" in international aviation and sought a legal framework in
the form of a multilateral convention based on freedom of the
air." In its view, any international organization in the field of
aviation should concern itself with technical matters such as navi-
'Waldo, Sequels to the Chicago Aviation Conference, 11 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 609, 609 (1946).
SAND, Pax-rT & LYON, supra note 6, at 23.
'3 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 77-80, 549-50.
66 Id. at 544-66.
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gation and safety and should have no jurisdiction over the eco-
nomic issues.
The British, whose aircraft industry had been concentrated on
the production of fighters during the war and would therefore re-
quire a significant readjustment to manufacture civilian trans-
ports, ' took a position somewhere between the New Zealand
proposal of international ownership of air services and the Ameri-
can position of free enterprise. Fearing the power of American
air capability and believing that unlimited competition would only
lead to increased subsidies for the various national airlines, they
argued for "controlled development" of aviation, rather than free
enterprise. "8 They urged the creation of an International Air Au-
thority to assume responsibility for the expansion of post-war
international aviation on an equitable basis among the states while
assuring an equilibrium between air transport capacity and de-
mand." To achieve these goals, the Authority, in addition to
having competence over technical matters, would have the power
to determine the needed frequency of services to be operated by all
countries on international routes, to fix the applicable rates, and
to allocate participation in such services to the countries con-
cerned." In a somewhat similar vein, the Canadians also pro-
posed an International Air Authority, which like the United
States Civil Aeronautics Board, would issue permits to interna-
tional carriers for particular routes and frequencies, and in doing
so would take account of competitive factors."
Thus, at the start of the Chicago Conference, the states ap-
proached the problem of organizing international aviation without
a common theory or assumption. It was clear that if a compre-
hensive legal framework was to emerge from the Chicago meeting,
major compromises would have to be made, or at least a con-
67 Jennings, Some Aspects of the International Law of the Air, 75 RECUEIL
DEs CouRs 513, 523 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Jennings]. As a result of a
wartime agreement, the United States, on the other hand, concentrated on the
production of long-range bombers and transport planes. The British felt that
the United States could convert more easily than the United Kingdom to the
production of civil aircraft after the war. Id.
"8 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 568.
69 Id. at 569.
70 Id. at 566-70.
7"id. at 570-91. See Jennings, supra note 67, at 524-25.
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sensus reached, on the fundamental question of whether post-war
international aviation would be organized as a business engaged
in free enterprise, an internationally regulated industry, or an in-
ternationally owned public utility.
At this stage in the development of international air law, think-
ing and conceptualization had evolved to the point where scholars
and government officials no longer referred to a generalized and
undifferentiated "freedom of the air," but rather spoke of the
freedom or privilege to enter the airspace of another state for a
particular purpose. Such a functional analysis led to the recogni-
tion of the existence of the five freedoms of the air: 1) freedom to
fly across the territory of a state without landing-often referred
to as freedom of transit; 2) freedom to land for non-traffic pur-
poses; 3) freedom to take traffic from the carrier's home country
to a foreign country; 4) freedom to bring traffic from a foreign
country to the home country; and 5) freedom to pick up and
discharge traffic at intermediate points between the home country
and the foreign country.M The first two have been called the
"political" or "technical" freedoms, and they are necessary, of
course, to operate a service over or through a foreign country.m
The last three are known as the commercial freedoms, and they are
essential to exploit the traffic market of the foreign state itself.'4
After rejecting the New Zealand plan in the initial phases of
the conference, the delegates spent most of the remainder seeking
an acceptable formula by which the states might grant any or all
of these five freedoms to each other in a single comprehensive
multilateral agreement. A treaty granting all five was probably
doomed from the start since it would have meant a virtual aban-
donment of the principle of sovereignty over airspace and would
also have deprived the individual states of bargaining power to
protect their national airlines, then in various stages of develop-
ment. In the end, the inability of the two leading air powers, the
United States and the United Kingdom, to reach a general agree-
ment on the matter meant that the Chicago Conference was un-
able to achieve the multilateral framework its sponsors had sought.
7' Jennings, supra note 67, at 522.
73 Id. at 522-23.
74 Id.
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The work of the Chicago Conference culminated in a lengthy
Final Act ' consisting of twelve resolutions and five appendices,
four of which were draft international agreements to be opened for
signature: the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation,"6
the Convention on International Civil Aviation," the International
Air Services Transit Agreement,' and the International Air Trans-
port Agreement." A fifth appendix contained twelve draft technical
annexes treating such matters as communications, safety, air traffic
control, and aircraft registration."
Of these documents, the agreement having the greatest continu-
ing significance is the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
originally signed in Chicago by thirty-two states and adhered to
as of September 1, 1978, by 143 states." Specifically superceding
the Paris Convention of 1919,' the Chicago Convention established
in more lengthy and detailed form the basic, though incomplete,
r The complete text of the Final Act can be found in 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 62, at 113-372.
" Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature,
Dec. 7, 1944, replaced, Apr. 4, 1947, 59 Stat. 1516, E.A.S. No. 469. The aim
of this agreement was to establish a provisional organization, known as the Pro-
visional International Civil Aviation Organization, until such time (not to exceed
three years) as the permanent convention came into effect. Id. at art. I, §§ 1 & 3.
"Chicago Convention, supra note 51.
78 International Air Services Transit Agreement, opened for signature, Dec.
7, 1944, entered into force, Jan. 30, 1945, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487 [here-
inafter cited as International Agreement].
79 International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature, Dec. 7, 1944,
entered into force, Feb. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 488 [hereinafter cited
as International Air Transport Agreement].
80 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 184. The intent of the technical annexes,
according to the Final Act, was to achieve "[tihe largest possible degree of inter-
national standardization of practice in many matters . . . important to safe,
expeditious and easy air navigation." Id. at 123. Accordingly, the Final Act urged
"the States of the world, bearing in mind their present international obligations,
* * * to accept these practices as ones toward which the national practices of the
several States should be directed as far and as rapidly as may prove practicable."
Id. at 124.
81 WAGNER, supra note 7, at 129.
2 2 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 57, at A4-A8.
8 Article 80 of the Chicago Convention, supra note 51, provides as follows:
Each contracting State undertakes, immediately upon the coming
into force of this Convention, to give notice of denunciation of the
Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation signed
at Paris on October 13, 1919, or the Convention of Commercial
Aviation signed at Habana on February 20, 1928, if it is a party
to either.
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legal framework for international civil aviation and laid the
foundations for an international organization, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to assist in its development.
In terms virtually identical to article 1 of the Paris Convention,
the first article of the Chicago Convention reaffirmed that every
state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory." Article 5, on the other hand, purported to
grant the contracting parties the first two freedoms of transit and
of landing for non-technical purposes; however, it specifically
provided that such privileges were only to apply to "aircraft not
engaged in scheduled international air services."' Thus, the en-
joyment by an air carrier in its regularly scheduled operations of
any of the five freedoms would require the conclusion of a separate
agreement between the state of the air carrier and the foreign
country whose airspace the carrier intended to enter."
Apparently the reason that the Convention distinguished sched-
uled from nonscheduled services and granted the latter the first
two freedoms was that nonscheduled services at the time did not
have great commercial or economic significance."' It did not, how-
ever, give carte blanche to the commercial development of non-
"Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 1.
'Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 5. Article 6 of the Chicago
Convention, supra note 51, reinforces this provision when it states, "[n]o scheduled
international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a con-
tracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that
State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization."
The Convention also specifically states that its provisions are inapplicable to
"state aircraft," which includes aircraft used in military, police, and customs
services. Id. at art. 3. Aircraft belonging to state-owned airlines are not to be
considered state aircraft.
"For example it was a valid exercise of sovereignty, in keeping with the
provisions of the Chicago Convention, when certain African states in 1963 pro-
hibited South African Airways from over-flying their territories. 1 SlAWCROSS
& BEAUMONT, supra note 27, at 192.
" Cheng, Beyond Bermuda, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: LAW, ORGANI-
ZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 81, 82 (N. Matte ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Cheng]. Although the Convention itself does not define the term "sched-
uled international air service," the ICAO Council has defined it as a series of
flights that a) pass through the airspace over the territory of more than one
state; b) is performed by aircraft for the transport of passengers, mail or cargo
for remuneration in such a manner that each flight is open to use by members
of the public; and c) is operated, so as to serve traffic between the same two
or more points, either according to a published time table or with flights so
regular or frequent that they constitute a recognizable system series. ICAO Doc.
7278-C/841 (1952).
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scheduled service, for it specifically provided that aircraft engaged
in carriage for hire on other than a scheduled basis had the privi-
lege of taking on and discharging passengers, cargo, or mail "sub-
ject to the right of any state where such embarkation or discharge
takes place to impose such regulations, conditions or limitations
as it may consider desirable."88 This final provision enabled any
state to regulate the exercise of the commercial freedoms by non-
scheduled aircraft virtually to the same extent as scheduled serv-
ices. The implications of the Chicago Convention were clear: the
development of scheduled international air service, and to a sig-
nificant extent unscheduled service as well, would necessitate fur-
ther agreement among the states. Such agreement might be arrived
at either on a multilateral or bilateral basis.
Two of the other agreements that emerged from the Chicago
Conference represented an attempt to provide a multilateral ap-
proach to the problem. The first was the International Air Services
Transit Agreement," otherwise known as "The Two Freedoms
Agreement," by which each contracting party granted to all other
contracting parties with respect to scheduled international air
services, "(1) The privilege to fly across its territory without land-
ing; (2) The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes."'" This
agreement if accepted by most of the nations of the world would
facilitate significantly the attainment of a global air transportation
network, for it would enable states that wished to establish air
service with one another to do so on a bilateral basis without
the involvement or authorization of the intermediate countries
flown over."' As of September, 1978, ninety-two nations, including
the United States, had become parties to the agreement."
The exercise of the two freedoms is, however, subject to cer-
8 Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 5. With the increase in im-
portance of nonscheduled service, commercial nonscheduled flights have become
as much subject to prior authorization as scheduled services. Cheng, supra note
87, at 82-83.
"9 See note 78, supra.
00 International Agreement, supra note 78, at art. I, § 1. The Agreement itself
does not define "non-traffic purposes," however, article 96(d) of the Chicago
Convention defines "stop for non-traffic purposes" as "a landing for any purpose
other than taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail." Chicago Conven-
tion, supra note 51, at art. 96(d).
"' WAGNER, supra note 7, at 142.
"
2See 2 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 57, at A4-A8.
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tain conditions, including the provisions of the Chicago Conven-
tion, the use of routes and airports designated by the state whose
airspace is entered, and the payment of reasonable charges for the
use of airports and other facilities." In addition, a contracting state
granting to the airlines of another state the privilege of stopping
for non-traffic purposes may require such airline to offer reason-
able commercial service at the points at which the stops are made."
The Chicago Conference also prepared the draft of the Inter-
national Air Transport Agreement,"7 commonly known as the "Five
Freedoms Agreement," by which each contracting party gave the
other contracting parties all five of the freedoms of the air. While
its draftsmen obviously intended it to be the basis for a truly multi-
lateral framework founded upon principles of free enterprise, the
Agreement was never able to overcome the fundamental opposi-
tion to such a concept expressed by many nations at the Confer-
ence. In the end, in addition to the United States, only a few
widely scattered small countries ever ratified the Agreement,
and the United States itself, in the face of this dissension, ulti-
mately denounced the Agreement in 1946;" consequently, it never
become an effective means for cooperation in international air
services.
The failure of the Chicago Conference to formulate a compre-
hensive multilateral framework meant that international aviation
in the post-war era would have to develop on the basis of bilateral
agreements between concerned states. The delegates themselves
were clearly aware of this possibility, for the Final Acte ' included a
standard form bilateral agreement to be used in such cases. 8 In
fact, it would significantly influence the language and form of the
numerous bilateral agreements concluded after the war. Under
such "Chicago-type" agreements, the contracting parties granted
I International Agreement, supra note 78, at art. I, § 4.
9Id. at art. I, § 3.
'5 International Air Transport Agreement, supra note 79.
1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 27, at 209. This took effect from
July 25, 1947 as a result of a notice of denunciation given by the United States
on July 25, 1946. Id. As of January 1977, only twelve states remained parties to
the convention. Id.
97 I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 127-29.
8 I SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 27, at 210.
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
each other specified rights (transit, non-traffic stops, or commer-
cial entry) over described routes, including the designated ports of
call at which the commercial rights of embarkation or debarka-
tion of passengers and cargos were permitted. Moreover, they set
down basic principles of non-discrimination and mutuality of
treatment.
The Chicago model did not, however, specifically deal with the
economic allocation of the burdens and benefits arising out of such
bilateral service, nor did it refer to such matters as frequencies,
capacities, and rates. It was precisely the need to regulate these
issues which had led the United Kingdom to oppose the United
States proposal of basing commercial international aviation on
free competition. After the Chicago Conference, the two coun-
tries, meeting in Bermuda, finally did resolve their differences in
a statement of principles known as the Bermuda Plan which was
eventually incorporated into their 1946 Air Services Agreement,"
commonly referred to as the Bermuda Agreement. A compromise
between the United States' position of free enterprise and the British
position of controlled development,' the Bermuda Agreement
granted each of the parties the two technical freedoms but pro-
vided that the three commercial freedoms could be exercised only
in accordance with certain conditions so as to enable each party
to have an equal opportunity to share equitably in the economic
benefits to be derived from air transportation between their re-
spective countries. Thus, each party could enjoy the commercial
privileges at designated airports and predetermined routes only
so long as certain general principles (known as the Bermuda
Capacity Principles) were respected: air transport facilities avail-
able to the traveling public were to bear a close relationship to
the public's requirements for such transport; the carriers of each
nation were to have a fair and equal opportunity to operate on any
designated route between the two territories; and the interests of
the carriers of the other country were to be taken into consideration
"Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, signed, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No. 1507
[hereinafter cited as Bermuda I].
"' See generally Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at
the Past, Present and Future of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. Am
L. & COM. 419, 420 (1975).
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so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provided
on the same route.' The Agreement itself did not set specific
limits on capacity, but if a government believed that a foreign
airline was not respecting the above-mentioned conditions, it
could request consultation with the other government on the
matter.' 2 This ex post facto review represented an effort to har-
monize predetermination of capacity originally demanded by the
United Kingdom with total free enterprise initially proposed by
the United States. In addition, the United States agreed to a
machinery for the control of rates in the form of the International
Air Transport Association (IATA),"' an organization of carriers
originally established in 1919 and revived after World War II.
IATA would play an important role in the development of civil
aviation in the post-war era.
The Bermuda agreement set the pattern for international avia-
tion development in the following years, and as a result today the
legal foundations of international air transportation rest on an
intricate network of over 1200 bilateral agreements.' A combi-
nation of a commercial arrangement and a set of regulatory mea-
sures," the post-war bilateral air services agreement has generally
drawn its form from the Chicago model but has derived its sub-
stance with respect to economic rights from the Bermuda Agree-
ment. Standard provisions in such agreements deal with designa-
tion of routes covered; rates and their approval and/or disapproval;
safety standards; charges for the use of public airports and other
facilities; customs treatment of fuel, oil, and spare parts; principles
to govern competition and capacity; and mechanisms for the
settlement of disputes.
Although the Chicago Conference failed to promulgate the
economic rules of the game, it did succeed in formulating numer-
ous detailed technical rules in the Final Act's Annexes, covering
such matters as communication systems and navigational aids,
101 Bermuda I, supra note 99, at S§ 4, 5, 6.
102 Id. S 9.
"o Bermuda I, supra note 99, at Annex II.
4 Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer Space, 27 INr'L
& COMP. L.Q. 576, 579 (1978).
I" Gertler, Bilateral Air Transport Agreements: Non-Bermuda Reflections,
42 J. AIR L. & COM. 779, 817 (1976).
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characteristics of airports and landing areas, rules of the air and
air traffic control practice, airworthiness of aircraft, registration
and identification of aircraft, log book requirements, aeronautical
maps and charts, customs procedures, and search, rescue and in-
vestigation of accidents.
The annexes themselves, however, have no application within
the territory of the individual contracting states. The signatories
to the Final Act were merely urged to accept the practices de-
fined therein as ones toward which their national practices should
be directed "as far and as rapidly as may prove practicable."'" By
virtue of article 12 of the Convention, a contracting state "under-
took" to keep its own regulations, to the greatest possible ex-
tent, uniform with those established under the Convention and
to ensure that every aircraft flying over its territory and all air-
craft carrying its nationality respected the regulations governing
flight; however, it was not bound to do so, but could enact differ-
ent regulations if it so chose. Thus, here too, the principle of
sovereignty prevailed, for each contracting party maintained its
own legislative autonomy. Over the high seas, where the sovereignty
of the individual states does not extend, the Convention provides
that the rules in force shall be those established under the Conven-
tion."' The problem was that the Convention itself, as distinguished
from the technical annexes to the Final Act, set down virtually no
rules relating to flight.!"
To foster the development of such rules, as well as international
aviation in general, the Chicago Convention established the legal
foundations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), thus replacing both ICAN and CITEJA. According to
article 44 of the Convention, the objectives of ICAO are to de-
velop the principles and techniques of international air navigation
and to foster the planning and development of international air
transport so as to:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil
aviation throughout the world;
1'0 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 124.
107 Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 12.
108T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION 80 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BUERGENTHAL].
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(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for
peaceful purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air
navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competi-
tion;
(f) Insure that the rights of the contracting States are fully re-
spected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to
operate international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of inter-
national civil aeronautics. 109
Despite the breadth of these objectives, ICAO's power to achieve
them through binding rules and regulations is extremely limited.
Under article 37 of the Convention, ICAO's Council is em-
powered to adopt and amend such international standards and
recommend practices on a variety of specified technical matters
largely relating to aviation safety, regularity and efficiency." Over
the years, the Council has adopted a significant number of such
international standards and recommended procedures (SARPS)
in the form of Annexes to the Convention. While member states
under article 37 undertake "to collaborate in securing the highest
practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards and
procedures,""' they are not bound by ICAO Annexes but may
deviate therefrom where compliance is impracticable."' In such
case, they must give official notification to the organization of any
differences between their own practices and those established by
the ICAO international standard."' In addition to the above men-
' Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 44.
"'
0 Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 37. Under article 90(a) of the
Chicago Convention, supra note 51, the adoption of an annex authorized in
article 54 requires a two-thirds vote of the Council, then submission to each
contracting state. It becomes effective three months after submission unless a
majority of member states register their disapproval with the Council. Chicago
Convention, supra note 51, at art. 90(a).
'"' Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 37.
112 Id. at art. 38.
"' Id. In practice, many states fail to notify ICAO of such differences. "[A]s
a general proposition, no state or pilot can justifiably rely on the absence of
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tioned legislative functions, the ICAO has also worked for the
development of international air law through the preparation of
treaties and conventions affecting various issues such as hijacking
and the recognition of property rights in aircraft;"' however, it
has not experienced unqualified success in this area.
ICAO is therefore by no means a supra-national lawmaking
body and its limited legislative powers are subject to the sovereignty
of the individual member states. It may be argued that this struc-
ture once again represents the triumph of unilateral action over
international rules and is therefore a retrograde step from what
existed under its predecessor, the International Commission for
Air Navigation,"' which had the power to bind member states to
its technical rules. On the other hand, compliance with technical
standards depends to a significant extent on the economic means
of a member state, rather than on its political ideology. Since the
extent of economic means varies so dramatically among the na-
tions of the world, the noncompulsory nature of the ICAO's rules
is probably a realistic way of advancing airline security and
efficiency while trying to accommodate the disparities in national
development '1-an application of the truism that the Little Prince
learned in his travels: "One must require from each one the duty
which each one can perform . Accepted authority rests first of
all on reason!" ''
The Chicago Convention, coupled with the Bermuda Agree-
ment, established a basic framework for international aviation in
reported differences as indicia that a particular standard established in an Annex
is in force in or being complied with by a state which has not filed the notice
required by Article 38." BUERGENTHAL, supra note 108, at 100.
14 See generally FitzGerald, The International Civil Aviation Organization
and the Development of Conventions on International Air Law (1947-1978), 3
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 51-120 (1978).
n5 The technical annexes of the 1919 Paris Convention were not merely goals
toward which the states should strive, but were as binding on the contracting
parties as other provisions of the Convention. Moreover, the International Com-
mission for Air Navigation had the power, by a three-fourths vote of its mem-
bers, to amend the annexes and such amendments also bound the individual
member states. Paris Convention, supra note 25, at art. 34. See BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 108, at 119. The power of ICAN to bind member states was one of
the reasons for the refusal of the United States to ratify the 1919 Paris Conven-
tion. WAGNER, supra note 7, at 88.
"I BUERGENTHAL, supra note 108, at 121.
'
17A. DE SAINT EXUPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 38 (K. Woods trans. 1943).
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the post-war era, a framework that sought to accommodate the
basic tensions arising from the conflicts between national sov-
ereignty and freedom of the sky, free enterprise and order in the
air, multilateral cooperation and unilateral action, and nondiscrimi-
nation and national favoritism. The framework had major gaps, but
it nonetheless permitted international aviation to achieve significant
development for over thirty years. New forces would arise in the
world to introduce further conflict and tensions into the prevailing
regime of international air law.
III. CONFLICTS PRESENT
The major technological, economic, and political changes to
which the world has been subjected since 1944 have placed sig-
nificant stress on public international air law as they have on the
entire fabric of international law. Before examining the tensions
which they have engendered, it may be appropriate to look first
at the nature of these forces of change.
A. The Forces of Change
Vast advances in aviation technology, particularly with respect
to long-range, wide-bodied jet aircraft, have greatly increased the
utility of international aviation to mankind and have resulted in
a dramatic expansion of the aviation market far beyond the ex-
pectations of the delegates at the Chicago Conference. At the
same time, the costly nature of this technology has meant that
states and carriers seeking to participate in any meaningful way
in international aviation have had to commit substantial capital
and human resource to the endeavor. While advances in tech-
nology have yielded benefits to human commerce and interchange,
they have also brought aviation to the point where it has the
capacity to injure the environment through pollution and other
factors.
The years since 1944 also witnessed major changes in the inter-
national economy. A significant shift in wealth from the West-
and from the United States in particular-to other parts of the
world has taken place. With that shift has come the emergence of
new centers of power which now insist on a voice in international
lawmaking and which cannot easily be overridden as was often
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the case in the past. A major reason for this shift in wealth, of
course, has been the dramatic increase in world fuel and energy
costs which began in the early 1970's as a result of the concerted
pricing action by the oil producers in the face of growing demand
by the industrialized nations. This factor has had a direct and
immediate impact on civil aviation in the form of rapidly esca-
lating operating costs, which when coupled with increased capital
outlays, has resulted in reduced carrier profit margins-, a powerful
force prompting the nations of the world to take action to pro-
tect their national carriers.
Beyond these technological and economic changes is the fact
that the international community has undergone a profound struc-
tural revolution 18 since World War II as a result of decolonization
and the emergence of numerous new nations. In general, the new
nations have not been content to leave international aviation to
the old, industrialized powers, but have instead sought to partici-
pate in it in varying degrees. Not only have they subscribed to
the Chicago Convention and become members of ICAO, but they
have also established their own international air carriers despite
the fact that many do not possess sufficient material and technical
resources to compete effectively in the international market. While
some scholars have lamented this phenomenon, considering such
airlines to be "non-viable,''... the new nations of the world, tak-
ing seriously their right to a fair opportunity to operate interna-
tional airlines, suggested by Article 44 of the Chicago Conven-
tion, have viewed a national carrier as an essential attribute of
national identity and an indispensable link to the outside world.
For them, international aviation is definitely not just a business.
As a result, their governments have actively sought to protect
their national airlines by imposing various restrictions and condi-
tions on foreign competitors operating in their territories."'
The existence of numerous new states with so many different
traditions, cultures and ideologies has also vastly complicated the
process of reaching agreement on international legal principles in
"
8 Sohn, The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4
(1978).
1' Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer Space, 27 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 576, 581 (1978).
120 Id.
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general and international air law in particular. The international
aviation community has shifted from a rather homogeneous club
of western industrialized countries to a heterogeneous group which
now includes economies in various stages of development and
reflecting divergent ideologies. Solutions to international problems
can no longer be imposed by a few western states, but must in-
stead be achieved slowly and patiently through consensus. The
Law of the Sea Conference, ' a lengthy and arduous process, per-
haps best illustrates the magnitude of the task of forging any new
regime for international aviation. At the same time, the advent of
so many new states has made the bilateral approach to interna-
tional air transport regulation an extremely difficult process indeed.
The substantial increase in the number of states alone sig-
nificantly complicates arriving at a consensus on any issue relat-
ing to international aviation. Moreover, many of the new states
do not share the economic and political ideologies and assump-
tions that prevailed among the western nations who dominated
aviation at the time of the Chicago Conference. For example,
many base their economies on central planning, rather than mar-
ket forces, and virtually all view theories of "free enterprise,"
"economic competition," and "comparative advantage in inter-
national trade" with suspicion as doctrines that merely allow rich
nations to become richer at the expense of the poor. Out of feel-
ings of past exploitation and a desire for an increased share in the
wealth of the world has come a demand for a "new international
economic order," the principles, of which are expressed in such
documents as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States,122 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
in 1975. While the Charter does not mention aviation specific-
ally," it seems fairly clear that the new states are seeking a new
1 See generally Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979).
122G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doe. A/RES/3281 (xxix) (1975), reproduced in
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1975).
2 Article 27 of the Charter, however, specifically deals with invisible trade,
a term which clearly includes international commercial aviation. It provides as
follows:
1. Every State has the right to enjoy fully the benefits of world
trade and to engage in the expansion of such trade.
2. World invisible trade, based on efficiency and mutual and equit-
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international economic order, not only in trade and investment,
but also on the seas and in the air as well.'
B. The Resulting Conflicts
The above mentioned forces of change have created both eco-
nomic and political conflicts in public international air law today.
1. Economic Conflicts
The introduction of new aviation technology in the form of
wide-bodied jet aircraft, as well as the advent of numerous new
carriers, both scheduled and non-scheduled, resulted in the crea-
tion of significant over-capacity in international aviation." This
over-capacity, when coupled with rising fuel and operational costs,
led to rapidly declining profit margins for many national carriers
and ultimately to demands that their governments take action to
protect them. Gradually pressure began to mount to revise the
Chicago-Bermuda regime determining how the nations of the
world share in the economic benefits of international aviation.
The protectionist movement reached a peak when the United
Kingdom, alleging that Bermuda I gave benefits to American
carriers much in excess of those conferred on British carriers, de-
nounced the Bermuda Agreement on June 22, 1976, and re-
quested the negotiation of a new air services agreement between
the two countries." After protracted and heated dicussions, the
able benefit, furthering the expansion of the world economy, is the
common goal of all States. The role of developing countries in
world invisible trade should be enhanced and strengthened consistent
with the above objectives, particular attention being paid to the
special needs of developing countries.
3. All States should co-operate with developing countries in their
endeavours to increase their capacity to earn foreign exchange from
invisible transactions, in accordance with the potential and needs
of each developing country and consistent with the objectives men-
tioned above.
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, 260 (1975).
'1 Abraham, Politiques Aeriennes Internationales Vues Par la France, in
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: LAW, ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE
FuTuR 3 (N. Matte ed. 1976). See also Koffi, Contribution Africaine Au De-
veloppement du Transport Aerien International, in INTERNATIONAL Am TRANS-
PORT: LAW, ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE FuTURE 23 (N. Matte ed. 1976).
'2 Comment, Bermuda 11: The British Revolution of 1976, 44 J. AIR L. &
COM. 111, 114-15 (1978).
"'Bld. at 113-15.
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two states eventually hammered out an agreement, commonly
known as Bermuda II, ' which represented yet a further departure
from the limited free enterprise position of Bermuda I in the
direction of an internationally regulated industry, a position the
British had espoused at Chicago over thirty years before.
Under Bermuda II, the United States not only lost fifth free-
dom rights to many European cities and accepted limitations on
designated airlines, but the parties also agreed to express con-
trols on capacity. To a significant extent, the British approach
reflected a demand not for an equal opportunity to compete, but
rather for an equal share in the benefits of commercial aviation
between the two countries. Implicit in this position is the concept
that one state has a right to-indeed "owns"-a definite share in
the air traffic between the countries. " While the concept of
"ownership" of air traffic like ownership of the stars, might startle
the Little Prince, it would appear to have figured in the thinking
of various carriers, including at times those in the United States.'"
The age old question of "who owns the air?" had taken on a new
dimension by the 1970's.
For the developing nations, if not for others, the concept of
ownership of the benefits of air traffic is far from absurd. The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States sets down the
principle that economic and political relations among states are
to be governed by "mutual and equitable benefit,""' and its basic
emphasis throughout is upon an equitable sharing of economic
activities, rather than upon an equal opportunity to compete for
them. At the same time the Charter also provides that "Every
State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, in-
cluding possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural
127 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland Concerning Air Services, signed, July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S.
No. 8641, as amended, Apr. 25, 1978, 29 U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. 8965 [here-
inafter cited as Bermuda II]. See generally Comment, Bermuda H: The British
Revolution of 1976, 44 J. AR L. & COM. 111 (1978).
128 Wassenbergh, Bilateral Ad Absurdum in International Air Transportation?,
in INTERNATIONAL Am TRANSPORT: LAW, ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE 127 (N. Matte ed. 1976).
2 9 WASSENBERGH, supra note 3, at 24.
'30G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (xxix) (1975), reproduced in
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, 254 (1975).
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resources and economic activities."''" The desire for a more equit-
able share of trade, when coupled with a reaffirmation of sov-
ereignty over national wealth and economic activities, has led
many states to abandon equality of opportunity as an underpinning
of the trade system and to espouse an equitable share in its bene-
fits as a goal of the new international economic order. At the same
time, it is well to point out that in the area of international avia-
tion as in many other areas, the developing nations do not consti-
tute a monolith and that certain of them are prepared to compete
on a more liberal basis than are many established European
powers.
The United States and certain other countries have not, how-
ever, accepted the idea of international aviation as a tightly regu-
lated industry in which countries have a fixed share of the bene-
fits." In reaction to Bermuda II, the United States has sought to
negotiate new agreements emphasizing competition and free enter-
prise, and has enacted legislation to establish guidelines for future
bilateral negotiations on this basis."
Having deregulated domestic civil aviation, it would appear
that the United States is seeking to foster the deregulation of in-
ternational air transportation as well. The achievement of that
goal will of course necessitate agreement among sovereign states.
In view of the ideological and economic diversity prevailing in
the world today, one ought not to assume, particularly in light
of the history of international air law to date, that such agreement
will be arrived at easily or at all. To assume that it can be achieved
through "flexibility" or "innovative strategies"'" is to underesti-
mate the profound and fundamental nature of the conflict between
the concept of air transportation as a business which relies on
market forces and competition on the one hand and that of air
transportation as an internationally regulated industry in which
the nations of the world share equitably on the other. Wassenbergh
13 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, 254-55 (1975).
"' See Klen & Leister, The Struggle for a Competitive Market Structure in
International Aviation: The Benelux Protocols Take United States Policies a
Step Forward, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 557, 567-68 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Klen & Leister].
1  International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
1See Klein & Leister, supra note 132, at 592.
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pointed to the difficulty in a recent article when he stated: "There
is no compromise possible between competition and protection.
The compromise to be sought is the definition of 'fair' competi-
tion." A definition of fair competition, of course, raises the
issue of equity in international aviation, and equity is precisely
the objective of those who seek a new international economic order.
A further area of economic conflict concerns the charges that
air carriers are required to pay to foreign governments for the use
of airports, airways, and related facilities.3" Because of the tech-
nological demands of modern aviation, the states of the world
have been required to make increasingly large investments in
needed facilities and equipment. To recover these costs, they have
felt justified in imposing increasing charges on the carriers who
use them. ' Viewing such charges as a burden that is fast becom-
ing unbearable, the airlines have argued that user charges are
often imposed in a discriminatory manner and are also unreason-
able in that they may have no relationship to the actual cost of
use. ' Thus far, the provisions of international law as found in
existing multilateral and bilateral agreements appear inadequate
to resolve the problem. '39 For example, article 15 of the Chicago
Convention requires that charges for the use of airports and air
navigation facilities imposed on aircraft engaged in international
service be non-discriminatory; * however, it does not specifically
require that such charges be reasonable in light of the use actually
made of the facilities in question, nor does it provide a remedy for
charges in contravention of its provisions. The United States has
attempted a unilateral solution through the International Air
Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 19744 which
empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to levy compensatory
charges (similar to a countervailing duty) on carriers of the foreign
'3Wassenbergh, Towards a New Model Bilateral Air Transport Services
Agreement?, 3 AIR L. 197, 209 (1978).
136 See generally Pogue & Davidson, User Charges in International Aviation,
73 AM. J. INt'L L. 42 (1979).
137 Id.
136 Id.
' 1 Id. at 46.
140 Chicago Convention, supra note 51, at art. 51.
'"Pub. L. No. 93-623, 88 Stat. 2102 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1151 note,
1160, 1373, 1376-77, 1472 and 1517 (1976)).
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country that has imposed unreasonable or discriminatory user
charges, but it would seem that this subject will only find a satis-
factory resolution through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty.
The ideological diversity among the states of the world has also
led to conflicts of a political nature, one of the most significant of
which concerns the proper solution to be applied to the suppres-
sion of aerial hijackings and other crimes on board aircraft in
international flight. Because the problem of aerial hijackings is
international in scope, national legislative solutions', unless enacted
by all states throughout the world, would hardly be an effective
deterrent. On the other hand, existing principles of international
law have not until recently dealt directly with the problem, and
analogy to the traditional law of piracy proved to be of little help.'
Problems of jurisdiction,' one of the essential attributes of
state sovereignty, prevented effective measures to deter and punish
the perpetrators of crimes on board aircraft. A jurisdictional issue
lay in the question of which state had jurisdiction over the offense.
In a particular case, a conflict of jurisdiction might exist, for ex-
ample, between the state of registry and the state in whose airspace
the crime was committed. Indeed, there might be uncertainty as to
whether any state had jurisdiction at all, in a case in which the
state of registry did not claim jurisdiction over crimes on board
its aircraft and the incident took place in airspace over the high
seas. Extradition was a further problem'" since many states re-
fused to extradite their nationals, would not do so in case of
political offenses, or would only extradiate if they were a party to a
treaty with the state to which the individual concerned was to be
extradited.
It was therefore readily apparent that the only eflective solu-
tion to the problem was to be found in a multilateral treaty cover-
ing criminal offenses on board aircraft. Toward this end, the na-
tions of the world undertook a piecemeal solution1" through the
142 See generally N. JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
(1974).
4 See generally S. SHUBBER, JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES ON BOARD AIRCRAFr
(1973).
144 1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 27, at 522.
145 Emanuelli, Legal Aspects of Aerial Terrorism: The Piecemeal vs. The
Comprehensive Approach, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 503, 504-05 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Emanuelli].
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preparation over a decade of three separate treaties: the 1963
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft;'' the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; '4 and the 1971 Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation.'"
The elaboration of these Conventions, which was not achieved
without a certain degree of political conflict,'' has made a sub-
stantial contribution toward defining international legal principles
applicable to unlawful interference with international civil avia-
tion. The Tokyo Convention, article 3, recognizes that the state
of registration has jurisdiction over offenses and acts committed
on board and specifically requires that state to take such measures
as may be necessary to exercise its jurisdiction over offenses
committed on board aircraft so registered."' Insofar as hijacking
is concerned, the Convention commits the contracting parties to
take "all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to
its lawful commander and to preserve his control of the aircraft,"
as well as to permit the aircraft, after release, to continue its jour-
ney as soon as practicable."' On the other hand, a contracting
state is not obliged to extradite an offender who comes within
its jurisdiction;".2 consequently, the Tokyo Convention offers little
real deterrence to hijacking.
With the increase in aerial terrorism in the late 1960's and early
1970's, the international community sought to establish a specific
deterrence regime through the Hague and Montreal Conventions.
'4 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, done, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S.
219 [hereinafter cited as Tokyo Convention].
147 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Convention].
148 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, done, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 [herein-
after cited as Montreal Convention].
149 See FitzGerald, The International Civil Aviation Organization and the
Development of Conventions on International Air Law (1947-1978), 3 ANNALS Ant
& SPACE L. 51, 95-96 (1978).
"'Tokyo Convention, supra note 146, at art. 3.
ld. at art. 11.
"'Id. at art. 16(2).
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These agreements define as an offense various acts of intentional
interference with international civil aviation and oblige each con-
tracting state to make such acts punishable under its own law by
severe penalties.1" Furthermore, they oblige all contracting states
in which the offender may be found either to prosecute such person
or extradite him or her to a state having appropriate jurisdiction
as specified in the Convention.1 ' Thus, the basic scheme of the
treaties is to create a credible deterrence against terrorism by in-
suring that the offender will be punished some place. The effective-
ness of this scheme presupposes that most of the states of the world
are contracting parties and that no safe haven exists. Unfortunately,
many states have declined to ratify them. As of 1978, out of 149
United Nations members, eighty-eight had ratified the Tokyo
Convention, eighty-six had ratified the Hague Convention, and
eighty-four had ratified the Montreal Convention." As a result,
safe havens, such as Algeria, Cuba, and Libya"' do continue to
exist.
The refusal to participate in these treaty schemes is due to the
unwillingness of many states, particularly the new states, to give
up sovereignty over political actions and to participate in the
punishment of offenders with whose ideological motivations they
fundamentally sympathize."" ' Moreover, the preference of sov-
ereignty over international legal principles in some countries may
stem from a fear in weak regimes that state action against hijack-
ings in particular cases as required by treaty would subject the
government in question to dangerous domestic reaction or else
injure its relations with allies who sympathize with such extremism.
In any event, in this area of international air law, as in so many
others, a truly effective multilateral solution remains to be achieved.
153 Hague Convention, supra note 147, at art. 2; Montreal Convention, supra
note 148, at art. 3.
3 Hague Convention, supra note 147, at art. 7; Montreal Convention, supra
note 148, at art. 7.
I Barrett, Terrorism and the Airline Passenger, 128 NEW L.J. 499, 499
(1978).
156 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 253 (1979). Libya has how-
ever signed the Tokyo Convention. Id.
157 Emanuelli, supra note 145, at 517.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Public international air law may now be facing a state of major
transition as a result of the tensions discussed above. It is un-
clear, however, whether the states of the world will seek solutions
in unilateral action or in the formulation of generally accepted
international principles. In short, one may ask whether we are
moving progressively toward a rule-oriented system of international
aviation or toward one dominated by power politics. What indeed
are the forces which will shape air law in the future? Having ex-
perienced Bermuda II, can we now expect Chicago II, the long-
awaited multilateral framework which will set down a comprehen-
sive system for the regulation of international civil aviation?
One may of course criticize the present system of bilateral
agreements on grounds of extreme complexity and therefore urge
its replacement by a truly multilateral framework, if only for
purposes of simplicity. On the other hand, the post-war regime
of bilateral agreements has shown itself remarkably flexible in
meeting changing circumstances over the years. Individual bilateral
agreements, like cells in an organism, have been subjected to a
process of renewal through virtually constant renegotiation, and
as a result the system as a whole has been revised and adapted
to meet new challenges.
The international community is undoubtedly far too pluralistic
to arrive in the very near future at a comprehensive, global system
of rules. Moreover, it is highly unlikely, given present national
attitudes, that any system which does emerge will be based on
principles of open skies and free competition. While certain advo-
cates in the United States may be tempted to raise these principles
to the level of natural law (if not moral precepts) just as the busi-
nessman did in asserting his claim to the stars, it must be recog-
nized that much of the rest of the world views them with suspicion,
if not outright skepticism. Any multilateral framework must take
account of the disparate aspirations and capabilities of a multitude
of countries, and accordingly may have to devise means to allow
certain groups to participate more effectively. Toward this end, it
might therefore be necessary to accord certain nations special privi-
leges, similar to generalized preferences granted developing coun-
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tries in international trade. For example, airlines from small coun-
tries might be granted disproportionate opportunities in the markets
of larger countries as a means of encouraging their development.
On the other hand, rather than seeking a global framework at the
outset, it may be more feasible to focus on the creation of regional
groupings, either for purposes of exchanging rights among their
members or for negotiating as a block with outside countries.
Thus far international civil aviation has been viewed as a busi-
ness, a phenomenon resulting at least in part from the economic
orientation of the western nations who pioneered its development
and dominated the Chicago Conference. It may well be, however,
that many nations, faced with capital and energy costs, as well
as fuel shortages, may eventually join together to organize their
air services as an internationally owned public utility, so as to
achieve the most efficient use of available resources.
While the large air powers would, of course, insist on maintain-
ing their own national airlines on a traditional basis, smaller coun-
tries may find that banding together to form international operat-
ing companies is the most efficient and feasible way to participate
in internaitonal aviation. One example of this approach is Air
Afrique, a company created by treaty among eleven African na-
tions to operate a single airline.' At the present time, the world
is witnessing the emergence of a variety of multi-national coopera-
tive efforts which seek to bring together capital and technology
in innovative structures to achieve productive purposes. The enter-
prises that produced the Concorde and the European Airbus are
examples of such an approach. It may well be that the operation
of international civil aviation will also witness this phenomenon
or at least greater cooperation among international carriers in the
years ahead. The challenge of international air law will be to
find the rules and the structures to facilitate that cooperation and
to enable all of mankind, in large nations and in small, to benefit
from international aviation. In this process, the technologically
advanced countries which have led in taming the airways and
space may be tempted to assert proprietary rights because after all
"they thought of it first"; however, it is also well to remember
151 Treaty on Air Transport in Africa, done, Mar. 28, 1961, ICAO Circular
98-AT/19, at 9, 27-28 (Nov. 1970).
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what the Little Prince learned from a fox during his travels: "'Men
have forgotten this truth,'" said the fox. "'But you must not forget
it. You become responsible, forever, for what you have tamed.' """
159 A. DE SAINT EXUPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 72 (K. Woods trans. 1943).
